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Abstract
The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individual self-selection
but has not paid enough attention to the possibility that buyers form a coalition
to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate the goods. In this paper, we design
the optimal sale mechanism which takes into account both individual and coali-
tion incentive compatibility focusing on the role of asymmetric information among
buyers.
We show that when buyer coalition is formed under asymmetric information,
the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although in the
optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are not equalized across
buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), they fail to realize the gains from
arbitrage because of the transaction costs in coalition formation generated by
asymmetric information.
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The theory of monopolistic screening1 (second-degree price discrimination) studies mo-
nopolist’s optimal pricing scheme when she has incomplete information about buyers’
individual preferences.2 According to the theory, the monopolist can maximize her proﬁt
by using a menu of packages which induces each type of buyer to select the package de-
signed for him. While the theory tackles the self-selection issue at the individual level,
it has not paid enough attention to the possibility that buyers might form a coalition
to coordinate their purchases, possibly at the expenses of the seller. In other words,
the theory is concerned with individual incentive compatibility but not with coalition
incentive compatibility.
In reality, there exist rich evidences of buyers’ joint actions. Bidders’ collusive be-
havior in auctions is well acknowledged and auction literature has been devoting an
increasing attention to the topic.3 We observe a lot of cooperatives formed by buyers to
purchase goods jointly.4 In the case of information goods such as CDs, DVDs, softwares,
consumers often share goods by illegally copying products among themselves.5
In this paper, we study the optimal sale mechanism which takes into account both
individual and coalition incentive compatibility focusing on the role of asymmetric infor-
mation among buyers (about each other’s willingness to pay) at the coalition formation
stage. In particular, we are interested in i) identifying the transaction costs in coalition
formation that are generated by asymmetric information and ii) designing the optimal
sale mechanism that exploits these transaction costs.
Consider for example the situation in which an upstream monopolist sells her goods
to two downstream ﬁrms operating in separate markets. Given a menu of quantity-
transfer pairs oﬀered by the monopolist, the two downstream ﬁrms can employ two
1See, for instance, Maskin and Riley (1984) and Mussa and Rosen (1978) for an introduction.
2In what follows, we use ‘she’ to represent the monopolist or the seller and ‘he’ to represent a buyer
or the third-party.
3For examples, see Caillaud and Jehiel (1998), Graham and Marshall (1987) and McAfee and McMil-
lan (1992).
4See Heﬂebower, R. (1980). He describes three types of supply cooperatives. First, farmers form
cooperatives to purchase feeds, fertilizers, petroleum products etc. Second, there also exist cooperatives
run by urban businesses: for instance, baking companies form cooperatives to purchases materials and
equipments cooperatively. Third, there are consumer cooperatives.
5See, for instance, Bakos et als (1999).
1instruments to increase their joint payoﬀs. First, they can jointly decide which pair each
buyer should choose. In our paper, this is modeled by manipulation of the reports which
the buyers send into the sale mechanism. Second, after maximizing their pie through
the manipulation of reports, they can reallocate among themselves the goods bought
from the seller. We assume that they can use side-transfers to share the gains from
manipulation of reports and/or reallocation of goods. As the main result, we show that
when buyer coalition is formed under asymmetric information, the monopolist can do
as well as when there is no coalition by fully exploiting the transaction costs in coalition
formation. Although in the optimal sale mechanism the marginal rates of substitutions
are not equalized across buyers with diﬀerent types (hence there exists room for arbi-
trage), the buyers fail to realize any gain from arbitrage because of the incentive problem
inside the coalition. We quantify the transaction costs due to asymmetric information
and show that they are larger than the gains from arbitrage. We also show that the
allocation obtained by the optimal sale mechanism which deters buyer coalition at no
cost can be implemented through a menu of two-part tariﬀs.
In our model, the seller can produce any positive amount of homogeneous goods at a
constant marginal cost.6 She oﬀers a sale mechanism to a ﬁnite number of buyers. For
expositional simplicity, we focus on the two-type environment in most of the sections
and show later on (in Section 6) that our main result extends to more general settings.
In the two-type setting, a buyer has either high valuation (H-type) or low valuation
(L-type) for the goods on sale. Types are independently and identically distributed and
a buyer’s type is his private information. In the optimal sale mechanism without buyer
coalition, the quantity sold to a buyer depends solely on his report. It is a standard
result that the quantity allocated to a type is determined by equalizing the marginal
cost to the type’s marginal surplus, evaluated with the virtual valuation. As is well
known, L-type’s virtual valuation is lower than his real valuation7 and this results in a
downward distortion in the quantity allocated to L-type compared to the ﬁrst-best level.
The fact that the seller intentionally introduces a downward distortion in L-type’s
quantity creates room for buyer arbitrage since, at the optimal quantity proﬁle, L-type
has a higher marginal surplus than H-type. Consider the previous example of one
6This makes our setting diﬀerent from an auction, in which the seller is tipically quantity-constrained.
7This is because the payment received by the monopolist from H-type is decreasing in the quantity
sold to L-type.
2upstream ﬁrm selling to two downstream ﬁrms. Suppose that the state of nature is
such that one of the downstream ﬁrms has H-type while the other has L-type. Then,
in the absence of transaction cost in coalition formation, they can successfully form a
coalition to reallocate some quantity from H-type to L-type and increase their joint
payoﬀs. Furthermore, this could alter buyers’ incentive to report truthfully in the sale
mechanism and eventually modify the seller’s expected proﬁt. In this paper, we focus
on how asymmetric information aﬀects buyers’ ability to do arbitrage and how it aﬀects
the seller’s proﬁt.
Drawing on Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000), we model coalition formation un-
der asymmetric information by a side-contract oﬀered to the buyers by a third-party
who wishes to maximize the sum of the buyers’ expected payoﬀs. The side-contract can
specify manipulation of the reports made into the sale mechanism and/or reallocation
of the goods obtained from the seller. The side-contract needs to satisfy incentive con-
straints as well as acceptance and budget balance constraints. The incentive constraints
have to be satisﬁed since the third-party is not informed about the buyers’ types. The
acceptance constraints are deﬁned with respect to the utilities that the buyers obtain
when they play the sale mechanism non-cooperatively.
We ﬁrst show that if the seller uses simple mechanisms in which the quantity allocated
to a buyer and his payment do not depend on the other buyers’ reports, buyer coalition
strictly hurts the seller. However, we also show that if the seller judiciously designs
the sale mechanism, buyer coalition cannot hurt the seller. More precisely, she can ﬁnd
sale mechanisms which deter any manipulation of reports and any reallocation of goods
and yield the same proﬁt as when there is no buyer coalition. We note that this result
critically depends on the assumption that coalition forms under asymmetric information.
In particular, the third party is not able to implement an eﬃcient arbitrage between H-
type and L-type because of the well-known tension between incentive and acceptance
constraints in the side-contract. More precisely, since the rent that H-type can obtain by
pretending to be L-type in the side mechanism is increasing in the quantity received by
L-type, if the third-party reallocates some quantity from H-type to L-type, then H-type
has a higher incentive to pretend to be L-type to the third-party. Hence, in order to
induce him to truthfully report his type, the third-party has to concede him more rent.8
8The alternative of lowering L-type’s payoﬀ is not feasible since it would induce L-type to reject the
side-contract.
3This increase in the rent is deﬁned as the transaction costs generated by asymmetric
information. Since the transaction costs are larger than the gains from reallocating
quantity from H-type to L-type, the eﬃcient arbitrage cannot be realized.
There exists a small literature about consumer coalition which mostly addresses
issues diﬀerent from the one we consider in this paper. Alger (1999) is one exception: She
studies the optimal menu of price-quantity pairs when consumers have access to multiple
and/or joint purchases in a two-type setting. She ﬁnds that with multiple purchases only,
the monopolist oﬀers strict quantity discounts while, with joint purchases only, discounts
are infeasible. However, her results are based on two speciﬁc assumptions. First, she
supposes that consumer coalitions are formed under complete information among the
consumers about each other’s type. Therefore, there are no transaction costs in coalition
formation in her setting. Furthermore, she restricts attention to homogeneous coalitions
by assuming that only consumers with the same type can form coalitions. Second, she
introduces a restriction on the set of mechanisms available to the seller by assuming
that the quantity allocated to a consumer and his payment do not depend on the other
consumers’ choices. In contrast, in our model, coalition is formed under asymmetric
information among buyers and consequently buyers with diﬀerent types can form a
coalition. Furthermore, we allow the seller to use complete contracts such that the
quantity sold to a buyer and his payment can depend on the others’ choices.
Innes and Sexton (1993, 1994) analyze the cases in which the monopolist is facing
identical consumers who may form coalitions. They show that even though consumers’
characteristics are homogeneous, the monopolist may price discriminate in order to deter
the formation of coalitions, whereas price discrimination is unproﬁtable in the absence
of the coalitions.
Using a third-party to model collusion under asymmetric information was ﬁrst intro-
duced in auction literature.9 While that literature studies the optimal mechanism in a
restricted set of mechanisms (they usually study the optimal reserve price in a ﬁrst or
second price auction), Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000) use a more general approach
in that they characterize the set of collusion-proof mechanisms and optimize in this set.
In their papers, they do not consider quantity reallocation10 and show that collusion has
9For examples, see Caillaud and Jehiel (1998), Graham and Marshall (1987) and McAfee and McMil-
lan (1992).
10Reallocation is simply infeasible in their settings. In the ﬁrst paper, the agents are regulated ﬁrms
4no bite if the agents’ types are independently distributed and if there is no restriction
on the set of the principal’s mechanisms. In contrast, collusion has bites in our model
since we consider reallocation. We show that the optimal mechanism under no collusion
can be implemented in a collusion-proof way if the seller fully exploits the transaction
costs in coalition formation. Furthermore, we extend our result in two directions. First,
while Laﬀont and Martmort do not study how to implement the outcome obtained from
the optimal mechanism, we show that in our model, the outcome can be implemented
b yam e n uo ft w o - p a r tt a t i ﬀs. Second, while Laﬀont and Martimort limit their analysis
to the two-agent-two-type setting, we show in Section 6 that our main result extends to
the n-buyer setting and to the three-type setting.
Our paper is to some extent related to the papers studying auctions with resale
(Ausubel and Cramton (1999), Zheng (2001)). For instance, Ausubel and Cramton
analyze the optimal auction under resale in a setting where buyers can engage in resale
after receiving goods from the auctioneer and the resale is (assumed to be) always
eﬃcient. They prove that the seller maximizes his proﬁt by allocating goods eﬃciently:
any ineﬃcient assignment would be corrected by ex post resale but the seller would fail
to capture the gains from the resale. In contrast, in our setting, buyers sign a binding
side-contract before each buyer chooses how much to buy. We show that when the
seller judiciously designs her mechanism, the buyers fail to achieve eﬃcient reallocation
because of the transaction costs in coalition formation.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model; in
particular, it describes the details of the coalition formation process. Section 3 reviews as
a benchmark the well-known optimal sale mechanisms when no buyer coalition is possible
and investigates whether those mechanisms leave any room for buyers’ joint actions.
Section 4 analyzes the third-party’s problem of designing the side-contract and Section
5 ﬁnds the optimal sale mechanism in the presence of buyer coalition. Section 6 extends
producing complementary inputs. They have independently distributed types and there exists room
for collusion since an exogenous restriction on the set of the principal’s mechanisms is imposed. In the
second paper, the agents are consumers of a public good. They have correlated types and therefore have
incentives to collude since the principal will fully extract their rents if they behave non-cooperatively.
11Zheng (2001) allows resale in a setting of one-good auction in which buyers’ values have diﬀerent
distributions. Any owner of the good is assumed to be able to choose a mechanism to sell it to others,
taking into account that subsequent owners may wish in turn to resell the good. He proves the existence
of an equilibrium which implements the same payoﬀs as when resale can be costlessly banned.
5our analysis to the n-buyer setting and to the three-type setting. In Section 7, we show
that our results are robust to relaxing assumptions about buyers’ oﬀ-the-equilibrium-
path beliefs and behavior in the coalition formation game. Concluding remarks are
gathered in Section 8. Most of the proofs are left to Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Preferences, information and mechanisms
A seller (for instance, an upstream monopolist) can produce any positive amount of
homogeneous goods at a constant marginal cost c>012 and sells the goods to n ≥ 2
buyers (for instance, downstream ﬁrms operating in separate markets). We introduce
the following informational assumptions: (i) the seller can observe only the amount of
goods sold to each buyer and whether or not the buyer uses her goods but (ii) the seller
cannot observe the actual quantity used by the buyer.13 In what follows, for expositional
simplicity, we focus on the two-buyer-two-type setting but we prove in Section 6 that
our main result extends to the n-buyer setting and to the three-type setting.
Buyer i (i =1 ,2) obtains payoﬀ θ
iu(qi) − ti from consuming quantity qi ≥ 0 of the
goods and paying ti ∈ R units of money to the seller. He privately observes his type
θ
i ∈ Θ ≡ {θL,θH},w h e r e∆θ ≡ θH − θL > 0.T h et y p e sθ
1 and θ
2 are identically and





= λ ∈ (0,1), i =1 ,2. The distribution of θ
1
and θ
2 is common knowledge. We suppose that u is twice diﬀerentiable, u0(q) > 0 >u 00(q)
for any q ≥ 0, u(0) = 0 and (θL − 1−λ
λ ∆θ)u0(0) >c>limq→+∞θHu0(q). The latter
inequalities guarantee that each type will receive a positive and ﬁnite quantity in the
optimal mechanism when buyer coalition is absent.14 Each buyer’s reservation utility is
normalized to zero regardless of type.
The seller designs a sale mechanism to maximize her expected proﬁt. A generic sale
mechanism is denoted by M and, according to the revelation principle, we can restrict
12The assumption of constant marginal cost is only made to simplify the exposition. Our main result,
Proposition 5 below, holds even if the marginal cost is increasing.
13These assumptions are similar to the assumptions adopted by Rey and Tirole (1986) to justify the
use of two-part tariﬀs by an upstream monopolist.
14Our results below, however, extend to the case in which the seller refuses to serve L-type, which
occurs if (θL − 1−λ
λ ∆θ)u0(0) ≤ c.


















∈ {θL,θH} is buyer i’s report, qi(·) is the quantity he receives and ti(·) is his
payment to the seller. Since buyers are ex ante identical, without loss of generality we
focus on symmetric mechanisms in which the quantity sold to a buyer and his payment
depend only on the reports and not on his identity. Then, we can introduce the following
notation, which simpliﬁes the exposition: For quantities,
qHH = q
1(θH,θH)=q





2(θH,θL),q LL = q
1(θL,θL)=q
2(θL,θL).
(tHH,t HL,t LH,t LL) ∈ R4 are similarly deﬁned. Let q ≡ (qHH,q HL,q LH,q LL) denote the
vector of quantities and t ≡ (tHH,t HL,t LH,t LL) denote the vector of transfers.
2.2 Buyer coalition
Drawing on Laﬀo n ta n dM a r t i m o r t( 1997, 2000), we model buyers’ coalition formation
by a side-contract, denoted by S,o ﬀered by a benevolent third-party.15 The third party
designs S in order to maximize the sum of buyers’ expected payoﬀss u b j e c tt oi n c e n t i v e
compatibility (since he does not know the types), participation and budget balance
constraints. The participation constraints are written with respect to the utility that
each type of buyer obtains when M is played non-cooperatively. Precisely, the game of
seller’s mechanism oﬀer cum buyer coalition formation has the following timing.
Stage 1. Nature draws buyers’ types (θ
1,θ
2); buyer i privately observes θ
i, i =1 ,2.
15The method of introducing a third party to model coalition formation may appear unrealistic, while
it may seem natural to consider some bargaining models to describe coalition formation. However,
we would like to point out an important property of the coalition formation model we analyze: the
revelation principle implies that given a speciﬁc bargaining game G, any allocation achieved by a
Bayesian equilibrium E of G can be obtained by a side-contract oﬀered by the third party. Since we let
the third party maximize the sum of the buyers’ expected payoﬀs, we are describing the upper bound
of what the coalition may achieve under asymmetric information. Furthermore, since we show later on
that collusion does not hurt the seller, the property implies that specifying any particular bargaining
game between the buyers would not change the main message of our paper as long as asymmetric
information between them remains.
7Stage 2. The seller proposes a sale mechanism M.
Stage 3. Each buyer simultaneously accepts or rejects M. If at least one buyer refuses
M, then each buyer earns the reservation utility and the following stages do not occur.16
Stage 4. If both buyers accept to play M, then the third party proposes them a direct
side-contract S in order to jointly manipulate their reports into M and to reallocate
between themselves the goods bought from the seller.17
Stage 5. Each buyer simultaneously accepts or rejects S.
Stage 6. If at least one buyer refuses S, then mechanism M is played non-cooperatively.
In this case, reports are directly made in M and stages 7 and 9 below do not occur. If
instead S has been accepted by both buyers, then reports are made into S.
Stage 7. As a function of the reports in S, the third party enforces the manipulation
of reports into M.
Stage 8. Quantities and transfers speciﬁed in M are enforced.
Stage 9. Quantity reallocation and side-transfers speciﬁed in S (if any) takes place
in the buyer coalition.















); i =1 ,2},
where e θ
i
∈ {θL,θH} is buyer i’s report to the third-party. Let φ(·) represent the reports









) ∈ Θ2 sent to the seller. We assume that φ can specify
stochastic manipulations, as this convexiﬁes the third-party’s feasible set. After the
buyers bought goods from the seller, the third-party can reallocate them within the
coalition. Let xi(·) represent the quantity of goods that buyer i receives from the third-
16We may also assume that if one buyer (say, buyer 1)v e t o e sM, then the seller can serve buyer 2
by oﬀering a mechanism which is diﬀerent from M. Our results below are robust to this modiﬁcation
as long as if the seller can prohibit buyer 2 from reselling to buyer 1 part of the goods he bought from
the seller. Since we assume that the seller can observe whether or not a buyer uses her goods, the seller
can deter any resale to a buyer who refused her oﬀer.
17To be rigorous, the Revelation Principle applies to the third-party’s design of S but does not
apply to the seller’s design of M. Thus, we should allow the seller to propose non-direct sale mecha-
nisms. Nevertheless, as Proposition 3 in Laﬀont and Martimort (2000) establishes, any perfect Bayesian
equilibrium outcome arising from a non-direct sale mechanism can be obtained as a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium outcome induced by a direct sale mechanism.
8party and yi(·) the monetary transfer from him to the third-party. We impose the




















After the third party proposed a side-contract S, a two-stage game is played by
buyers: in its ﬁrst stage (stage 5) each buyer accepts or rejects S; in the second stage
(stage 6) the buyers report types either into M or into S depending on their decisions
at the ﬁrst stage. In what follows, we use the term “coalition formation game” to refer
to the game which starts with the third-party’s proposal of S (at stage 4). We are
interested in (collusive continuation) equilibria of the coalition formation game in which
both buyers accept S; thus, no learning about types occurs along the equilibrium path.18




Assumption WCP19: Given an incentive compatible M,i fb u y e ri vetoes S
(which is an oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path event), then buyer j 6= i still has
prior beliefs about θ
i and the truthful equilibrium is played in M.
By deﬁnition, truthtelling is an equilibrium in M under prior beliefs if and only if M
is incentive compatible. Let V (θ
i) denote the expected payoﬀ of buyer i as a function
of his type in the truthful equilibrium in M.20 Then, V (θ
i) is the reservation utility
for type θ
i at the time of deciding whether to accept S or not: it is the payoﬀ that
the third-party should guarantee in order to induce a buyer with type θ
i ∈ {θL,θH}
to accept S. In Section 7, we show that our results are robust to relaxing our initial
assumptions about buyers’ oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path beliefs and behavior.
18Notice, however, that there also exists an equilibrium in which both buyers refuse any side mecha-
nism: if buyer i is vetoing any side mechanism, then rejecting is a best reply for buyer j.
20V (θ
i) does not depend on the identity i of the buyer since M is symmetric.
93 Do the optimal mechanisms without buyer coali-
tion exhibit room for joint actions?
In this section, we ﬁrst analyze the optimal mechanisms in the absence of buyer coalition
and then examine whether in such mechanisms there exists any room for buyers’ joint
actions.
3.1 The optimal mechanisms without buyer coalition
In this subsection, we characterize the proﬁt maximizing mechanisms when there is no
buyer coalition. The seller’s expected proﬁt with mechanism M = {q,t} is
Π =2 λ
2(tLL − cqLL)+2 λ(1 − λ)(tHL + tLH − cqHL − cqLH)+2 ( 1− λ)
2(tHH − cqHH)
M should satisfy the following Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints: for H-type,
(BICH) λ[θHu(qHL) − tHL]+( 1− λ)[θHu(qHH) − tHH]
≥ λ[θHu(qLL) − tLL]+( 1− λ)[θHu(qLH) − tLH];
(1)
for L-type,
(BICL) λ[θLu(qLL) − tLL]+( 1− λ)[θLu(qLH) − tLH]
≥ λ[θLu(qHL) − tHL]+( 1− λ)[θLu(qHH) − tHH].
(2)
M should also satisfy the following individual rationality constraints: for H-type,
(BIRH) λ[θHu(qHL) − tHL]+( 1− λ)[θHu(qHH) − tHH] ≥ 0; (3)
for L-type,
(BIRL) λ[θLu(qLL) − tLL]+( 1− λ)[θLu(qLH) − tLH] ≥ 0. (4)
The seller designs M to maximize Π subject to (1)t o( 4 ) .W ec h a r a c t e r i z et h eo p t i m a l
mechanisms in the next proposition:
Proposition 1 The optimal mechanisms in the absence of buyer coalition are charac-
terized as follows.













L, where (θL − 1−λ
λ ∆θ)u0(q∗
L)=c.
b) Transfers are such that constraints (BICH) and (BIRL) are binding.
Proof. The proof is standard and therefore it is omitted.
We ﬁrst note that, in Proposition 1, q∗
H and q∗
L are equal to the optimal quantities al-
located to H-type and L-type, respectively, when the seller faces only one buyer. In the
one-buyer case, it is well known that L-type’s virtual valuation is given by θL − 1−λ
λ ∆θ
since an increase in the quantity received by L-type reduces through (BICH) the pay-
ment that the seller obtains from H-type. This makes her introduce a downward dis-
tortion in the quantity allocated to L-type with respect to the ﬁrst-best level. Precisely,
the seller determines qL by equalizing the marginal cost to L-type’s marginal utility
evaluated with the virtual valuation. Proposition 1 states that, in the optimal mecha-
nisms for the two-buyer case, the quantity obtained by a buyer is uniquely determined
by his report regardless of the other buyer’s report and is equal to the quantity he would
receive in the one-buyer setting.
Inspecting (1) to (4) and Π shows that the transfer scheme t matters only to deter-
mine the values of ¯ tL ≡ λtLL +( 1− λ)tLH and of ¯ tH ≡ λtHL +( 1− λ)tHH. Therefore,
the seller has two degrees of freedom in choosing transfers which are expected payoﬀ
equivalent for her and for buyers. In particular, transfers can be designed in such a
way that each buyer’s payment is independent of the other buyer’s report. Precisely, by











follows, we use Md to denote the optimal mechanism in which the seller proposes the
quantities and the transfers that she would oﬀer in the one-buyer case: Md ≡
©
q∗,t dª




LL).I nMd, the payoﬀ of each buyer is fully determined by
his report only and, as a consequence, truthtelling is a dominant strategy. Basically, in
the absence of buyer coalition, the seller can maximize her proﬁt by dealing with each
buyer separately. It is easy to see that the outcome achieved by Md can be implemented
by a menu of two-part tariﬀs where the two-part tariﬀ designed for L-type has a kink.21
21The two-part tariﬀ for H- t y p et a k e st h ef o l l o w i n gf o r m :AH +pq where AH = td
H −cq∗
H and p = c.
The two-part tariﬀ for L- t y p en e e d sak i n ka tt h ep o i n tq = q∗
L in order to prevent H-type from buying
113.2 Room for buyers’ joint actions
In this subsection, we investigate whether the mechanisms characterized by Proposition
1 exhibit any room for buyers’ joint actions. We say that room for joint actions exists if
buyers can realize some gain by coordinating their actions in the absence of transaction
costs in coalition formation. Therefore, this section identiﬁes proﬁtable joint actions
in the absence of transaction costs and later on we verify whether these actions can
be implemented in the presence of asymmetric information between the buyers after
formally introducing the model of coalition formation under asymmetric information in
Section 4.
We distinguish two kinds of joint actions: manipulation of reports and quantity
reallocation. First, the buyers can coordinate their reports into M. Second, after buying
some goods from the seller, they can reallocate them within the coalition.
Reports manipulation only First, it turns out that when the seller proposes Md,i n
the absence of quantity reallocation, the buyers cannot generate any gain by coordinating
their reports. This occurs because, as we noted before, in Md, a buyer’s payoﬀ is
independent of the other buyer’s report. Therefore, there exists no joint manipulation
of reports which is proﬁtable.22
Quantity reallocation only Second, suppose that buyers can reallocate the goods
bought from the seller but cannot jointly manipulate their reports. Then, it is manifest
that when the buyers have the same types, there is no room for quantity reallocation
since the seller allocates the same quantity to each of them: either qHH (if θ
1 = θ
2 = θH)
or qLL (if θ
1 = θ
2 = θL). However, when one buyer has H-type and the other has L-type,
the latter’s marginal utility from consumption is strictly larger than the former’s one
s i n c ew eh a v eθHu0(q∗
H)=( θL − 1−λ
λ ∆θ)u0(q∗
L)=c. Therefore, they have an incentive
to reallocate some quantity from H-type to L-type. We note that this incentive for
more than q∗
L in case he reports θL. This gives the seller some discretion in choosing the marginal price.
For instance, she can use AL + pq such that AL = td
L − cq∗
L, p = c for q ≤ q∗




22Laﬀo n ta n dM a r t i m o r t( 1997) also show that in their setting, where the agents’ types are indepen-
dently distributed, there exists a dominant-strategy optimal mechanism which eliminates any gain from
joint manipulation of reports.
12reallocation originates from the fact that the seller introduces a downward distortion in
the quantity consumed by L-type in order to extract more rent from H-type. In contrast,
if the seller knew θ
1 and θ
2, there would be no room for quantity reallocation since the
ﬁrst-best quantity schedule (qFB
H ,qFB




Manipulation of reports and quantity reallocation Last, consider the case in
which buyers can jointly manipulate their reports and reallocate the goods. Now there
exists room for joint manipulations of reports in some mechanisms which are optimal
if reallocation is not feasible. For instance, when the seller proposes Md,w eh a v es e e n
that buyers will report truthfully in the absence of reallocation. However, if reallocation
is possible, then the coalition formed by two H-types has an incentive to report (θH,θL)















Moreover, it can be easily seen that the coalition formed by one H-type and one L-type
also has an incentive to report (θL,θL) to the seller.
We show in the next section that the same manipulations can be implemented by
a suitable side mechanism even though coalition formation takes place under asymmet-
ric information. This suggests that the seller may wish to use a more sophisticated
mechanism than Md when buyers can form a coalition.
4 Coalition formation under asymmetric informa-
tion
From now on, we assume that coalition formation occurs under asymmetric information
and study the game of seller’s mechanism oﬀer cum coalition formation by allowing
for both joint manipulation of reports and reallocation of goods. In particular, in this
section, we analyze the third-party’s design problem of S and characterize the constraints
which buyer coalition imposes on the seller’s design problem. In order to do this, we
need to introduce some deﬁnitions.
13Deﬁnition 1 A side-contract S∗ = {φ
∗(·),x i∗(·),y i∗(·)} is coalition-interim-eﬃcient
with respect to an incentive compatible mechanism M providing the reservation utili-














































































i) ≥ V (θ
i), for any θ
i ∈ Θ;




















In words, a side-contract is coalition-interim-eﬃcient with respect to M,i fi tm a x -
imizes the sum of the buyers’ expected utilities subject to incentive, acceptance and
budget balance constraints. Let us deﬁne the null side-contract, denoted by S0,a s
S0 ≡ {φ(·)=Id(·),x 1(·)=x2(·)=0 ,y 1(·)=y2(·)=0 }. I nw o r d s ,i nt h en u l l - s i d e
contract, no manipulation of reports, no reallocation of quantity and no side-transfer
occurs. When the third-party proposes S0,am e c h a n i s mM is not aﬀected by buyer
coalition. The next deﬁnition refers to this class of mechanisms.
Deﬁnition 2 An incentive compatible mechanism M is weakly collusion-proof if S0 is
coalition-interim-eﬃcient with respect to M.
The next proposition shows that Md is not weakly collusion-proof: Even though the
coalition forms under asymmetric information, the third party can ﬁnd a side-contract
which increases the buyers’ expected payoﬀ above the ones obtained by playing Md
truthtfully.
14Proposition 2 Suppose that the seller oﬀers Md. Then there exists a side-contract Sd
such that
(a) it satisﬁes (BICS), (BIRS), (BB : x) and (BB : y);
(b) it manipulates buyers’ reports into Md such that they report (θH,θL) if θ
1 = θ
2 = θH
and (θL,θL) if θ
1 6= θ
2 and it reallocates the quantities after the manipulations of reports.;
(c) With respect to the case of no coalition, Md◦Sd strictly increases each type of buyer’s
payoﬀ while it strictly reduces the seller’s proﬁt.
Proof. See Appendix.
According to Proposition 2, when the seller oﬀers the simple mechanism Md,t h e
buyer coalition can realize strict gains from suitably manipulating reports and reallo-
cating goods. In this case, the buyer coalition strictly reduces the seller’s proﬁtb e c a u s e
of the two following reasons: (i) in the states of nature in which the manipulations
of reports occur, the quantity sold to the buyers is strictly reduced with respect to
truthtelling and therefore the surplus which is generated by the trade is reduced; (ii)
each type of buyer obtains a higher payoﬀ than under truthtelling.
This proposition establishes that a “simple” mechanism like Md does not allow the
seller to obtain the same proﬁt as under no coalition formation. Therefore, we need
to ask whether better sale mechanisms than Md exist. The following proposition is
particularly important since it tells that in order to answer the previous question, we
can restrict our attention to the set of weakly collusion-proof mechanisms.
Proposition 3 (weakly collusion-proofness principle) There is no loss of general-
ity in restricting the seller to oﬀer weakly collusion-proof mechanisms in order to charac-
terize the outcome of any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game of seller’s mechanism
oﬀer cum coalition formation.
Proof. The proof is omitted since it is a straightforward adaptation of the proof for
Proposition 3 in Laﬀont and Martimort (2000).
The idea behind Proposition 3 is the following: since the third-party has no in-
formational or instrumental advantage over the seller and is subject to the incentive,
acceptance and budget balance constraints, any outcome that can be implemented by
allowing coalitions to manipulate reports and/or reallocate goods can be mimicked by
the seller in a collusion-proof way without any loss. The weakly collusion-proofness
15principle simpliﬁes our analysis, since what can be achieved by the seller is contained in
the set of weakly collusion-proof mechanisms.
In the next proposition, we characterize the set of weakly collusion-proof mecha-





L(x),i nw h i c hε ∈ [0,1) and x>0:
θ
ε










Lu(x − z) and q
ε
L(x) ≡ x − q
ε
H(x) (5)
We note that qε
H(x) is uniquely deﬁned since θHu(z)+θ
ε
Lu(x − z) is a strictly concave
function of z.I np a r t i c u l a r ,(qε
H(x),qε
L(x)) is the eﬃcient allocation of a total quantity
x>0 b e t w e e nab u y e rw i t hv a l u a t i o nθH and a buyer with valuation θ
ε
L. Finally, we
notice that if qε









Proposition 4 An incentive compatible sale mechanism M = {q,t} is weakly collusion-
proof if and only if there exists ε ∈ [0,1) such that
(a) the following coalition incentive constraints are satisﬁed: for HH coalition,
















































































































23We focus on the subset of mechanisms where L-type’s Bayesian individual incentive constraint is
not binding. We prove in Section 5 that the seller is not going to oﬀer a mechanism M such that
L-type’s incentive constraint binds in the side-contract which is optimal with respect to M.
16(b) the following no arbitrage constraint is satisﬁed
qHL = q
ε
H(qHL + qLH), (10)
(c) if ε > 0,t h e nH-type’s incentive constraint in the side mechanism is binding.
Proof. See Appendix.
When the coalition incentive constraints (7) to (9) are satisﬁed, the third-party
has no incentive to manipulate the buyers’ reports into M. I ns u c hac a s e ,n or o o m
for reallocation exists if θ
1 = θ
2,s i n c eM allocates the same quantity to each buyer.
Furthermore, if the no-arbitrage constraint (10) is satisﬁed, HL coalition has no incentive
to reallocate the goods that are bought from the seller after making truthful reports. We
note that in each coalition incentive constraint, both the left and right hand sides take
into account the reallocation of the goods. When both agents report the same types to
the third party, each buyer receives half of the total quantity available in the coalition:




), the total quantity is allocated
according to (5): see (8).
In (8) to (10), ε ∈ [0,1) appears. Roughly speaking, ε is the Lagrange multiplier of H-
type’s incentive constraint in the third-party’s design problem of S and it can be positive
when that constraint is binding.24 The seller has some ﬂexibility in choosing ε because
S0 satisﬁes the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for optimality in the third-party’s
problem for any ε ∈ [0,1). In the presence of complete information within the coalition,
the side mechanism does not need to satisfy any individual incentive constraint. Then
the coalition incentive and the no-arbitrage constraints under complete information are
obtained from (7) to (10) by taking ε equal to 0. Basically, in that setting, there are no
transaction costs in coalition formation and the third party simply maximizes the sum
of buyers payoﬀsf o re a c hp r o ﬁle of types by suitably manipulating reports or/and by
eﬃciently reallocating the goods. In other words, whatever gains from joint actions - if
there is any - are realized by buyers.
When the coalition is formed under asymmetric information, the side-contact has to
satisfy not only the participation constraints but also the incentive constraints. Since
the third-party has to guarantee each type of buyer the utility that he can obtain by
24Precisely, ε = δ
a+δ where δ is the Lagrange multiplier of H-type’s incentive constraint and a is a
strictly positive constant.
17non-cooperatively playing M,at e n s i o nb e t w e e n(BIRS
L) and (BICS
H) may arise, and it
may be costly to satisfy H-type’s incentive constraint; ε measures how costly it is. In
other words, ε captures the eﬀect of asymmetric information on the third-party’s decision
making. The coalition incentive constraints under asymmetric information diﬀer with
respect to the constraints under complete information because L-type’s valuation θL is
replaced with the virtual valuation θ
ε
L, which is smaller than the real valuation for ε > 0.
This is so because, as the quantity allocated to L-type (by the third party) increases, it
is more diﬃcult to satisfy H-type’s incentive constraint in the side mechanism. When
ε =1 , L-type’s virtual valuation in the third-party’s program is given by θL − 1−λ
λ ∆θ,
which is equal to L-type’s virtual valuation in the seller’s program under no buyer
coalition studied in Subsection 3.1. The seller has some ﬂexibility in choosing ε since
S0 is optimal for the third party if it satisﬁes the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
optimality in the third party’s problem for at least one ε in [0,1).
The virtual valuation θ
ε
L aﬀects the coalition incentive constrains through two chan-
nels. First, given a quantity consumed by L-type, the third-party evaluates his surplus
with θ
ε
L instead of θL. Second, given a total quantity available to a coalition, the value
of θ
ε
L aﬀects the third-party’s decision to reallocate the goods. As we said above, when
buyers report (θH,θH) or (θL,θL) in S, the third party gives each agent the half of the
total available quantity regardless of the value of ε. However, if buyers report (θH,θL)
in S, then the third-party reallocates the goods by equalizing H-type’s marginal surplus
to L-type’s marginal surplus and the latter is evaluated with θ
ε
L.T h el a r g e ri sε > 0,t h e
smaller is the quantity obtained by L-type in HL coalition. Finally, we observe that the
no-arbitrage constraint (10) requires H-type’s marginal surplus to be equal to L-type’s
virtual marginal surplus.
One might argue that the seller might ask the buyers for the information that they
may have learned during the course of coalition formation. However, since we show that
even though the seller is restricted to use grand-mechanisms which only depend on the
buyers’ types, she can deter buyer coalition at no cost, we do not need to consider more
general grand-mechanisms.
185 The optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism
In this section, we analyze the optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism. Observe that
when the third party proposes S0, (i) the Bayesian incentive constraints (BICS) in the
side mechanism are equal to (BICH) and (BICL) introduced in subsection 3.1; (ii) the
acceptance constraints (BIRS) in the side mechanism are automatically satisﬁed with
equality. Hence, in the presence of buyer coalition, the seller’s maximization program -
denoted by (P) -i sd e ﬁned as follows: she designs M and selects ε in order to maximize
her expected proﬁt Π subject to Bayesian individual incentive, Bayesian participation,
coalition incentive and no arbitrage constraints. However, the following lemma shows
that we can substantially reduce the number of constraints to take into account in




Π subject to (1)-(4) and (10)
Lemma 1 If the inequalities
2qHH ≥ qHL + qLH ≥ 2qLL, (11)
hold at the solution to Program (RP), then the solution of Program (RP) is equivalent
to that of Program (P) in terms of the expected payoﬀ for the seller and for each type of
buyer.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 basically says that (7)-(9) can be satisﬁed at no cost. In other words, (10)
is the only relevant constraint which buyer coalition introduces into the seller’s program
of Subsection 3.1. We now provide a simple intuition of why the coalition incentive
constraints do not reduce the seller’s proﬁt.
We start by considering transfers which satisfy (CICHH,HL) and (CICHL,LL) -w r i t -
ten below - with equality.
(CICHH,HL)2 θHu(qHH) − 2tHH ≥ 2θHu(
qHL + qLH
2
) − tHL − tLH
(CICHL,LL) θHu(qHL)+θ
ε







19Then we can prove that all the other coalition incentive constraints are automatically
satisﬁed if (11)h o l d s . 25 Let us regard each coalition as a consolidated agent and let V ²
k(x)
denote the total surplus that a coalition having k number of buyers with H-type derives
from consuming a total quantity x>0; k ∈ {0,1,2} is viewed as the “type” of the










for any x>0 and for any ε ∈ [0,1): the marginal surplus from consumption is strictly
increasing in k. Now we can apply a standard result from the theory of monopolistic
screening [see Maskin and Riley (1984)] to conclude that when local downward coalition
incentive constraints bind - in our case, (CICHH,HL) and (CICHL,LL) -, all the coalition
incentive constraints are satisﬁed if the quantity proﬁle for coalitions is monotone - i.e.,
if (11) holds- and if the single crossing condition holds.
Satisfying (CICHH,HL) and (CICHL,LL) with equality requires the seller to use two
degrees of freedom from the transfer schedule t,s a ytHH and tLL. The two remaining
degrees of freedom tLH and tHL are suﬃcient to deal with (1)-(4) without reducing proﬁt
since, as we noted in Subsection 3.1, transfers appear in (1)-(4) and Π only through the
values of ¯ tL ≡ λtLL +( 1− λ)tLH and of ¯ tH ≡ λtHL +( 1− λ)tHH.26
Lemma 1 is consistent with the ﬁndings in Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000). In
these papers, if the agents have independent types, all the coalition incentive constraints
can be satisﬁed without reducing the principal’s payoﬀ, unless there exist exogenous re-
strictions on the mechanisms which are available to the principal.27 However, reallocation
between agents is not considered in their settings simply because it is infeasible.
S i n c et h e r ei so n em o r ec o n s t r a i n ti n(RP) than in the seller’s program without buyer
coalition, the seller cannot earn more proﬁt in the presence of buyer coalition than in
its absence. However, the next proposition states that actually the proﬁt level is the
same in the two cases. More precisely, it guarantees the existence of a transfer schedule
which, paired with the quantity proﬁle q∗ of Proposition 1, enables the seller to achieve
the proﬁt that she obtains in the absence of buyer coalition.
Proposition 5 There exists a transfer scheme t∗ such that
25Actually, (11) is also necessary for the existence of transfers satisfying (7)-(9).
26F o r m a l l y ,i nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a1 in Appendix, we show that any value of ¯ tH and ¯ tL can be
attained by suitably choosing tHL and tLH as when the vector t ∈ R4 is unconstrained.
27Furthermore, to obtain that result, the principal does not need to exploit the transaction costs
created by asymmetric information at the coalition formation stage.
20(a) M∗ ≡ {q∗,t ∗} is an optimal mechanism in the absence of buyer coalition;
(b) M∗ is also weakly collusion-proof.
Proof. In the solution to (RP),b o t h(BICH) and (BIRL) bind, as in the optimal
mechanism with no buyer coalition (the usual arguments can be applied). Hence, the
seller obtains the same expected proﬁt in the two cases by setting q = q∗ if (10) is satisﬁed
at q∗; indeed, both (BICL) and (BIRH) are automatically satisﬁed. The proﬁle q∗ is
such that θHu0(q∗
HL)=( θL − 1−λ
λ ∆θ)u0(q∗
LH)=c, while condition (10) is satisﬁed by q∗




LH). Since we are interested in
the Sup of the seller’s proﬁt, we allow ε to take the value equal to one.28 Given that q∗
satisﬁes (10) for ε =1 , we conclude that in (RP) the seller earns as much proﬁta sw h e n
buyer coalition is absent. Finally, we observe that the payoﬀ equivalence between (RP)
and (P) applies because (11)h o l d sa tq∗.I np a r t i c u l a r ,g i v e nq∗ and ε =1 ,w ec a nﬁnd
a (unique) transfer proﬁle t∗ such that (BICH), (BIRL), (CICHH,HL) and (CICHH,HL)
bind29;( 11) guarantees that all the other coalition incentive constraints are satisﬁed.
Proposition 5 implies that all the constraints generated by collusion-proofness can
be satisﬁed at no cost. Hence, the seller can implement the same quantity proﬁle q∗ as in
the absence of buyer coalition and earn the same proﬁt. Under asymmetric information,
the possibility to form a coalition does not help the buyers to increase their payoﬀs.
Even though the third party aims at maximizing the buyers’ payoﬀsa n dt h e r ec l e a r l y
exists room to increase these payoﬀs by reallocating the goods within HL coalition, there
exists no side mechanism implementing a desirable reallocation when the seller proposes
M∗.30
To give a clear intuition of why the third-party fails to eﬃciently reallocate the goods,
in the next proposition we quantify both the gains from reallocation and the transaction
costs created by asymmetric information and then we show that the latter is strictly
larger than the former.
28Admittedly, ε = 1 is not feasible, according to Proposition 4. However, ε = 1 can be arbitrarily
closely approximated by feasible values of ε.
29See Appendix for the complete description of the transfers.
30We note that there exist inﬁnitely many transfer schemes - let b t denote one - such that (q∗,b t) is
optimal under no coalition formation and moreover strictly satisﬁes all the CIC. We considered t∗
above in order to ﬁx the ideas but there is no compelling reason to prefer t∗ to any transfer scheme
which strictly satisﬁes all CIC.
21Proposition 6 Suppose that the seller oﬀers M∗ = {q∗,t ∗} and that the third-party
does not manipulate reports but reallocates quantity ∆q ∈ (0,q∗
H] from H-type to L-type
in HL coalition. Then
(a) the expected gains from the reallocation is given by:
G ≡ 2λ(1 − λ){θL[u(q
∗
L + ∆q) − u(q
∗





(b) the transaction costs created by asymmetric information is given by:
TC ≡ 2(1 − λ)
2(∆θ)[u(q
∗
L + ∆q) − u(q
∗
L)], (12)
(c) we have TC− G>0 for any ∆q ∈ (0,q∗
H].
Proof. Since it is straightforward to compute the gains from reallocation, we focus on
the computation of the transaction costs. We ﬁr s tn o t et h a ts i n c et h er e n tt h a tH-type
can obtain by pretending to be L-type is increasing in the quantity received by L-type,
the reallocation increases H-type’s incentive to report L-type in the side mechanism.
Suppose now that buyer 2 reports his type truthfully in S and compute the payoﬀ that
H-type of buyer 1 obtains by pretending to be L-type to the third-party. Then, the H-
type’s expected surplus from consumption is given by θH [(1 − λ)u(q∗
L + ∆q)+λu(q∗
L)]
and his expected payment is equal, from the binding L-type’s participation constraint,
to θL [(1 − λ)u(q∗
L + ∆q)+λu(q∗
L)]. Hence, in order to implement the reallocation, the
third-party has to give an H-type a rent equal to (∆θ)[(1− λ)u(q∗
L + ∆q)+λu(q∗
L)],
which is larger than (∆θ)u(q∗
L),a nH-type’s rent in the absence of reallocation. This
increase in H-type’s rent represent the transaction costs in coalition formation created
by asymmetric information. From the ex ante point of view, the transaction costs are
given by (12). Since TC−G i sas t r i c t l yc o n v e xf u n c t i o no f∆q, the following inequality
holds:













(∆q)=0for any ∆q ∈ (0,q
∗
H]
We show below that the seller can implement the outcome achieved by the optimal
collusion-proof mechanism through a menu of two-part tariﬀs: so she does not need to
use a direct mechanism. Before that, however, we study the features of the transfers t∗
22that satisfy (BICH), (BIRL), (CICHH,HL) and (CICHH,HL) with equality when q = q∗
and ε =1 . This will be helpful in understanding the payment schemes used in the menu.
We run a thought experiment in two stages. First, we investigate how the transfers look
like when the coalition can manipulate reports but cannot reallocate goods. Second, we
examine how introducing reallocation modiﬁes the transfers.
In the absence of reallocation, (CICHH,HL) and (CICHL,LL) with q = q∗ and ε =1
are written as follows:
(CICHH,HL)2 θHu(q
∗
















The transfer schedule which satisﬁes (BICH), (BIRL), (CICHH,HL) and (CICHH,HL)








In fact, these are exactly the transfers speciﬁed in mechanism Md.31
When reallocation is feasible, coalition becomes more powerful because the buyers
can increase their joint payoﬀs from misreporting by suitably reallocating the goods.32
















This means that upon reporting a type, each buyer faces a lottery which determines his
payment as a function of the report of the other buyer. In particular, facing an L-type
is always bad news because then the payment is higher than when facing an H-type.
The intuition can be given as follows. As reallocation increases the gross payoﬀ that HL
coalition obtains after manipulating its reports to LL,atLL larger than td
LL is needed to
make such a manipulation less attractive. However, since (BIRL) is binding, an increase






LL. A similar argument applies to (CICHH,HL): tHL >t d
HL relaxes that constraint and
this implies, since (BICH) binds, a smaller tHH.
We now study the implementation through a menu of two-part tariﬀs. Suppose
that the seller oﬀers two tariﬀs, tariﬀ TH = {(AHH,p HH),(AHL,p HL)} and tariﬀ TL =
31In Md, it is unproﬁtable to manipulate reports because of strategic independence: the payoﬀ a
buyer obtains does not depend on the report of the other buyer.

















23{(ALH,p LH),(ALL,p LL)} where, for instance, AHL and pHL represent the ﬁxed fee and
the marginal price that the buyer who chooses tariﬀ TH has to pay when the other buyer







j, for j,k ∈ {H,L} and pHH = c,
pjk = c for q ≤ q
∗





j for jk ∈ {HL,LH,LL}.




Proposition 7 Suppose that the seller oﬀers {T ∗
H,T∗
L}. Then, regardless of whether or
n o tt h eb u y e r sc a nf o r mac o a l i t i o n ,
(a) each buyer accepts the oﬀer,
(b) j-type of buyer, with j ∈ {H,L}, chooses the tariﬀ T ∗
j and buys quantity q∗
j.
Proof. The proof is long and hence omitted.33 In the proof, we ﬁrst redeﬁne the third-
party’s program taking into account the fact that he can now choose the total quantity
to buy given a choice of tariﬀs and then study the program as in the proof of Proposition
4.
We mentioned in Subsection 3.1 that when coalition formation is impossible, the
optimal outcome can be implemented through a menu of two-part tariﬀsi nw h i c ht h e
tariﬀ designed for L-type has a kink. The above proposition states that a more compli-
c a t e dm e n uo ft w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀs can be used to implement the optimal outcome when the
buyers can form a coalition. Now the suitable menu of two-part tariﬀ is such that (i)
the ﬁxed fee paid by a buyer depends on the two-part tariﬀ chosen by the other buyer;
(ii)t h et a r i ﬀ a buyer faces has a kink unless both buyers choose the tariﬀ designed for
H-type. The kink is necessary because of the downward coalition incentive constraints
(CICHH,HL), (CICHH,LL) and (CICHL,LL).C o n s i d e r (CICHH,HL), for instance, and
assume that there is no kink in T ∗
H. Then, when both buyers have H-type, they have
an incentive to coordinate their purchases such that only one buyer chooses T∗
H, buys
more than q∗
H and shares it with the other buyer who chooses T∗
L.34 This deviation is
33The proof can be received upon request from the authors.
34Likewise, if there were no kink in T∗
L, then the buyer who pretended to be L-type may buy more
than q∗
L and then share with the other buyer.
24prevented by the increase in the marginal price - the kink - from c to θHu0(q∗
L).T h e
ﬁxed fee paid by a buyer needs to be dependent on the other buyer’s choice of two-part
tariﬀ since the optimal transfer scheme requires this sort of randomness.
6E x t e n s i o n s
In the previous sections, we considered the two-buyer-two-type setting in order to keep
the exposition and the intuition for the results as simple as possible. In this section,
we show that our main result (Proposition 5) can be extended to the n-buyer-two-type
setting and the two-buyer-three-type setting.
6.1 The case of n buyers
We here show that our main result holds when the seller faces n>2 buyers if we assume
that the only feasible coalition is the grand coalition, the one including all the buyers.
More precisely, we suppose that if at least one buyer rejects the side mechanism, then
M is played non-cooperatively (and with prior beliefs): coalitions of size smaller than n
are not going to arise. This assumption can be justiﬁed when any attempt to organize
a coalition - after the grand coalition was rejected - is suﬃciently time consuming such
that it is impossible for the third party to design a new side mechanism which is tailored
for the buyers who accepted the original side mechanism. Clearly, this assumption is
not needed if n =2but it makes the model quite tractable when n>2.
Without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to symmetric sale mechanisms,
which are now introduced. Let qLk (k =0 ,1,...,n− 1) denote the quantity allocated to




) ∈ Θn includes exactly
k number of buyers with H-type. The variables qHk, tHk and tLk are deﬁned similarly.
Let qn ≡ (qL0,...,qLn−1,q H1,...,qHn) and tn ≡ (tL0,...,t Ln−1,t H1,...,tHn) so that a sale
mechanism is given by Mn = {qn,t n}. Any optimal mechanism {q∗
n,t n} without buyer




H for any k and the expected payment of




Proposition 3, the weakly collusion-proofness principle, applies to this setting. Here
we generalize Proposition 4 by describing the conditions under which an incentive
compatible mechanism Mn is weakly collusion-proof. In order to do that, we need
25to investigate how goods are reallocated by the third party in a coalition containing
k ∈ {1,...,n − 1} number of buyers with H-type (in what follows, such a coalition will
be referred to as a “k−coalition”) when x>0 is the total quantity available; the cases
k =0and k = n are obvious. In any k−coalition, the third-party allocates the same
quantity to each buyer of the same type since u00 < 0. Precisely, if quantity z is al-
located to each H-type, then each L-type receives x−kz
n−k and the quantity received by
H-type qε
Hk(x) is deﬁned as
q
ε
Hk(x) ≡ arg max
z∈[0, x
k]












If (14) is satisﬁed, a k−coalition which reports truthfully in Mn has no incentive to alter
the allocation determined by the seller. Notice that
V
ε
k (x) ≡ max
z∈[0,x
k]

















n). Again, we may regard each coalition as a consolidated agent and
interpret V ε
k as the surplus function for a coalition with type k.F o r a k−coalition,
manipulating its reports is equivalent to reporting a number k06 = k of buyers with
H-type. The next proposition summarizes the coalition incentive constraints and the
no-arbitrage constraint.
Proposition 8 An incentive compatible sale mechanism Mn is weakly collusion-proof if
and only if there exists ε ∈ [0,1) such that
(a) the following coalition incentive constraints are satisﬁed:
V
ε




0qHk0 +( n − k
0)qLk0] − k
0tHk0 − (n − k
0)tLk0 for any (k,k
0) ∈ {0,1,...,n}
2
(b) the no-arbitrage condition (14) holds for k =1 ,...,n− 1.
(c) if ε > 0,t h e nH-type’s incentive constraint in the side mechanism is binding.
26The next proposition establishes that the buyer coalition does not create any loss to
t h es e l l e r ,a si nt h ec a s eo fn =2 .
Proposition 9 Given the quantity schedule q∗
n, there exists transfers t∗




n} is optimal under no buyer coalition and is also weakly collusion-proof.
Proof. See Appendix.
6.2 The case of three types
Mechanism design problems under collusion are viewed qualitatively more complicated
when there are more than two types than when there are only two types. For instance,
Laﬀo n ta n dM a r t i m o r t( 1997, 2000) limit their analysis to the two-type setting since it
is hard to determine the binding CIC constraints when there are more than two types.
However, we can show that in our model the main result — Proposition 5 — extends to
the three-type setting. The main diﬃculty in performing such an extension comes from
the fact that the single-crossing condition for coalitions holds only partially since no
order can be made between coalitions HL and MM. Nevertheless, we are able to prove
Proposition 12.
We assume n =2for simplicity. Buyer i privately observes his type θ
i ∈ Θ ≡
{θL,θM,θH},w h e r e∆H ≡ θH−θM > 0 and ∆M ≡ θM−θL > 0.T h et y p e sθ
1 and θ
2 are















. The distribution of θ
1 and θ
2 i sc o m m o nk n o w l e d g e . I nt h e
absence of buyer coalition, the virtual valuations of type M and L are given by:
θ
v

















L depends on the parameters




















limq→+∞θHu0(q), so that each type gets a positive and bounded quantity in case of no
coalition.













); i =1 ,2
o
.
27We here focus on symmetric mechanisms and introduce the following notation:
qjk ≡ q
1(θj,θk)=q
2(θk,θj),t jk ≡ t
1(θj,θk)=t
2(θk,θj),j , k = L,M,H
Therefore, M ≡ {q,t} where q ≡ {qjk}j,k=L,M,H and t ≡ {tjk}j,k=L,M,H.L e t ¯ tj ≡
pLtjL + pMtjM + pHtjH and ¯ uj ≡ pLu(qjL)+pMu(qjM)+pHu(qjH) with j = L,M,H.
Then, the expected proﬁti sg i v e nb y :
Π =2 ( pL¯ tL + pM¯ tM + pH¯ tM) − 2c[p
2
LqLL + pLpM(qLM + qML)+pLpH(qHL + qLH)]
−2c[p
2
MqMM + pMpH(qMH + qHM)+p
2
HqHH]
The Bayesian incentive compatibility and participation constraints are given by:
(BIC) θj¯ uj − ¯ tj ≥ θj¯ uj0 − ¯ tj0, j,j
0 = L,M,H
(BIR) θj¯ uj − ¯ tj ≥ 0, j = L,M,H
An optimal mechanism solves the problem max{q,t} Π s.t. (BIC) and (BIR). The next
proposition characterizes the optimal mechanisms in the absence of buyer coalition.
Proposition 10 The optimal mechanisms in the absence of buyer coalition are charac-
terized by










































b) Transfers are such that constraints (BICHM), (BICML) and (BIRL) bind.
Proof. The proof is standard and therefore is omitted.
As in the two-type case, the weakly collusion proof principle holds. Before we state







L; ii) the functions qε
j(x;jk) and qε
k(x;jk), jk = HM,HL,ML;
28iii) the functions V ε
jk(x), j,k = L,M,H as follows:
θ
ε
H ≡ θH, θ
ε

















ku(x − z) and q
ε











ku(x − z), j,k = L,M,H
where ε ≡ (εHM,εML) ∈ [0,1) × [0,+∞) and x>0.
The next proposition characterizes weakly collusion-proof mechanisms.
Proposition 11 An incentive compatible sale mechanism M is weakly collusion-proof
if and only if there exists ε ∈ [0,1) × [0,+∞) such that
(a) the coalition incentive constraints are satisﬁed
V
ε
jk(qjk + qkj) − tjk − tkj ≥ V
ε
jk(qj0k0 + qk0j0) − tj0k0 − tk0j0,f o r a n y j,k,j
0,k
0 (15)
(b) the no arbitrage constraints hold
qjk = q
ε
j(qjk + qkj;jk),f o r jk = HM,HL,ML. (16)
(c) if εHM > 0( resp. εML > 0),t h e n(BICS
HM)[ resp. (BICS
ML)] binds.
Proof. The proof is long (but is very similar to the proof of proposition 4) and hence
omitted.35
Finally, we can prove that the buyer coalition does not create any loss to the seller.











j,k=L,M,H such that M∗ ≡ {q∗,t ∗} is an optimal mechanism in the
absence of buyer coalition and is also weakly collusion-proof.
Proof. The proof goes along the same lines of the proof of proposition 5 (they are
brieﬂy sketched below), but is considerably longer, hence it is omitted.36
We now brieﬂy sketch the proof of the above result. First, as in the two-type case,
the principal can choose ε∗ ≡ (ε∗
HM,ε∗
ML) such that the third-party has the same virtual
35The proof can be received upon request from the authors.
36The proof can be received upon request from the authors.








L. This implies in particular that
conditional on that there is no manipulation of reports, the third-party will not reallocate
goods: the no-arbitrage constraints are satisﬁed. Second, there remain some degrees of
freedom in transfers in the optimal mechanisms under no coalition and the principal can
use this freedom to satisfy all the coalition incentive constraints. We conjecture that our
result will hold when there are more than three types as well.
7R o b u s t n e s s
I nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n sw eh a v em a d eas p e c i ﬁc assumption about buyers’ beliefs and
behavior in case the side mechanism is vetoed — namely, assumption WCP: buyers are
expected to play the truthtelling equilibrium of the sale mechanism (with prior beliefs).
In this section, we show that our results are robust to eliminating this assumption.
We recall that, given a sale mechanism M, in the coalition formation game, ﬁrst the
third party proposes a side mechanism S, then each buyer simultaneously announces
whether he accepts or refuses S and ﬁnally buyers report in S if S was unanimously
accepted, or in M otherwise. Under assumption WCP, we established above that if
M = M∗, then (i) the third party proposes S = S0; (ii) both buyers accept S0.I nt h i s
section, we show that (i) and (ii) do hold even though we eliminate assumption WCP.
Finally, we analyze the structure of the equilibria of the game which is played after both
buyers accepted S0.W ef o c u sh e r eo nt h ec a s eo fn =2a n di nS u b s e c t i o n s7 . 2a n d7 . 3
we make the following assumption37
u00(x)
u0(x)
is weakly increasing in x. (17)
7.1 Is M∗ more collusion-proof than weakly collusion-proof?
Mechanism M∗ is weakly collusion-proof according to deﬁnition 2, which rests on as-
sumption WCP. This assumption determines precisely the reservation utility for each
type of buyer at the time of deciding whether to accept or reject the side mechanism.
What if the third party expects the buyers to coordinate — following buyer 1’s (say)
37When u is a Bernoulli utility function over money, this assumption is called “non-increasing absolute
risk-aversion”.
30rejection of the side mechanism — on a non-truthful equilibrium of M∗,p o s s i b l yu n d e r
non-prior beliefs of buyer 2 about θ
1? Then, the acceptance constraints of buyer 1 in the
side mechanism design problem may be altered and eventually the third party may be
induced to select a non-null side mechanism. Nevertheless, the next proposition proves
that if M = M∗, then there exists no side mechanism S 6= S0 which might be accepted
by both agents and increase the third party’s payoﬀ.
Proposition 13 When M∗ is proposed, even without assumption WCP, there exists no
equilibrium in the coalition formation game in which the third party designs S 6= S0 and
both buyers accept S.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition basically says that M∗ is collusion-proof not only if the third party
believes that truthtelling is played in case S is rejected. Actually, S0 is proposed in any
collusive continuation equilibrium of the coalition formation game.
7.2 Robustness to cheap talk
In Subsection 7.1 we established that the choice of S0 by the third party is robust to the
various equilibria of M∗ he may expect the buyers to coordinate on if S0 is vetoed. Here
we prove that even without assumption WCP, buyers still have incentives to accept S0.
In principle, this result is not straightforward. Buyer 1 — for instance —, depending on
what he expects to be played if S0 i sr e j e c t e d ,m a yt r yt oi n c r e a s eh i sp a y o ﬀ by vetoing
S0. We below describe this issue and our answer in more detail.
As we mentioned above, a two stage game starts after S0 is proposed by the third
party. In the ﬁrst stage, each buyer i makes a preplay announcement (veto or accept)
which may signal some information about θ
i; in the second stage, buyers report in M∗
or in S0. In any case, however, in the second stage M∗ is actually played since S0 is null:
the ﬁrst stage is just a sort of cheap-talk stage in which a buyer may signal his type.
We know that no type wishes to reject S0 under assumption WCP, but what if buyer 1
expects that a non-truthful equilibrium of M∗ will be played (possibly under non-prior
beliefs of 2about θ
1)i nc a s eh ev e t o e sS0? H e r ew es t u d yw h e t h e ri ti sp o s s i b l ef o r
some type of buyer 1 to veto S0 — which is an out-of-equilibrium message — in order to
manipulate beliefs of buyer 2 about θ
1 a n dt h e nr e a c hs o m eb e t t e ro u t c o m ef o rh i m s e l f
31when playing M∗ at the next stage. In other words, we ask whether beliefs of buyer 2 —
following a deviation of 1 — exist such that buyer 1 (or just a type of buyer 1)g a i n sf r o m
rejecting S0. The answer to this question is negative and the following lemma provides
au s e f u ls t e p .
Lemma 2 Under (17), in M∗
(a) reporting L is strictly dominant for type L,
(b) type H strictly prefers reporting H to L if his opponent plays H and strictly prefers
reporting L to H if his opponent plays L.
Proof. See Appendix.
By using Lemma 2(a), we can prove that buyer 1 cannot gain from trying to manip-
ulate buyer 2’s beliefs through the cheap-talk stage.
Proposition 14 Under (17), there exists no belief of buyer 2 (following a deviation of
1) which supports an equilibrium of M∗ in which one (or both) type of buyer 1 is better
oﬀ with respect to truthtelling behavior.
Proof. Inequalities (13) imply that buyer 1 (regardless of his type) has a chance to be
better oﬀ with respect to the truthtelling equilibrium only if his opponent plays H more
often than under truthtelling. However, this cannot occur in any equilibrium of M∗ —
regardless of buyer 2’s beliefs about θ
1 - because reporting L is strictly dominant for
type Lof buyer 2. Hence, in any equilibrium of M∗ the probability that 2 reports H is
at most equal to the probability that 2 reports H under truthtelling.
We note that this proposition is stronger than Proposition 9 in Laﬀont and Martimort
(2000). Indeed, their result refers to the notion of ratiﬁability [see Cramton and Palfrey
(1995)], which allows buyer 2 to have only “reasonable” or “consistent” beliefs about θ
1.
In contrast, we do not need any ”sophisticated” argument in order to make our point:
simply no beliefs of 2 support buyer 1’s rejection of S0.
7.3 Multiplicity of equilibria in M∗
Consider the game of coalition formation immediately after both buyers accepted S0:
At that point in time, buyers have to report in S0. However, as we observed above, that
is equivalent to playing non-cooperatively M∗ with prior beliefs for both buyers, since
32each buyer i has prior beliefs about θ
j (j 6= i)a f t e rS0 has been unanimously accepted.
Although truthtelling is an equilibrium in M∗, there may exist other equilibria in M∗
which buyers may coordinate on. The next proposition addresses this issue.
Proposition 15 Under (17), there exists only one non-truthful equilibrium of M∗ played
with prior beliefs. In it, every buyer type reports L. For buyers, the latter equilibrium is
strictly Pareto-dominated by truthtelling.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since buyers strictly Pareto prefer truthtelling to the non-truthful equilibrium, coor-
dination on the latter seems unlikely to occur. Hence, non-uniqueness in M∗ does not
appear to be a problem for the seller.
8 Concluding remarks
We found that simple sale mechanisms in which the quantity sold to a buyer and his
payment depend solely on his own report create room for buyers’ joint actions such that
the buyers can realize strict gains at the seller’s loss by coordinating their purchases
and reallocating the goods. However, we showed that when the seller judiciously designs
her mechanism(s) by exploiting the transaction costs in coalition formation, buyer coali-
tion does not hurt her and, in particular, the buyers are unable to implement eﬃcient
arbitrage. We also showed that this outcome can be implemented through a menu of
two-part tariﬀs.
Our result is derived in a complete contract setting in which there is no restriction
on the set of contracts available to the seller. This setting corresponds to a situation
in which the seller faces a small number of buyers and knows well each buyer’s identity.
This allows the seller to use state-contingent contracts in which a buyer’s payment can
depend on the other buyers’ reports.
In contrast, when there are a large number of buyers (in particular, a mass of buy-
ers), the seller would not have complete information about the identities of the potential
buyers. This might impose some restrictions on the set of contracts available to the
seller as in Alger (1999). It would be interesting to study the impact of asymmetric
information on buyers’ joint actions in this setting.
33APPENDIX
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
T h es i d em e c h a n i s mSd m e n t i o n e di nt h es t a t e m e n to fP r o p o s i t i o n2i sf o r m a l l y
deﬁned as follows.














ˆ x>0,w i t hˆ x close to 0, x2d(HL)=−ˆ x; x2d(LH)=−x1d(HL)=ˆ x; x1d(LL)=
x2d(LL)=0 .








2 ; y1d(HL)=y2d(LH)=ˆ y,
y2d(HL)=y1d(LH)=−ˆ y; y1d(LL)=y2d(LL)=0 ,w h e r eˆ y>0 is still to be deﬁned.
In words, a coalition HH reports HL; then goods and transfers are equally shared be-
tween the buyers. A coalition HL or LH reports LL; then goods are slightly reallocated
from L-type to H-type and H-type pays ˆ y to L- type.
We prove that there exists an ˆ y>0 is such that all the incentive and participation
constraints in the side mechanism are satisﬁed (actually, they are slack). This establishes
that Sd can be implemented and that the payoﬀ of each buyer type is strictly larger than
the one from playing Md non-cooperatively.
Deﬁne ˆ qH ≡ q∗
L + x1d(HL) and ˆ qL ≡ q∗
L − x1d(HL).C o n s t r a i n t(BICS
H) is
λ[θHu(ˆ qH) − θLu(q
∗

















L)+( 1− λ)[θHu(ˆ qL) − θLu(q
∗
L)+y] (18)
Consider ˜ y = θH[u(q∗
L) − u(ˆ qL)].W i t hy =˜ y, (i) the right hand of (18) is exactly equal
to V (θH); (ii) since ˆ x is close to 0,( 18) is strictly satisﬁed, hence (BIRS
H) holds; (iii)
(BIRS
L) holds. Now consider increasing y above ˜ y until the point ˆ y at which (18) binds.
At that point, (BIRS
H) still holds because the right hand side of (18) increased above
V (θH); clearly, also (BIRS
L) still holds since ˇ y>˜ y. In order to prove that (BICS
L) is
satisﬁed, a standard argument can be used: just sum (BICS
L) and (BICS
H) (which binds)





2 > ˆ qL.
T h es i d em e c h a n i s mSd may not be the optimal side mechanism against Md.I n
particular, reallocation is not performed eﬃciently in HL coalition since otherwise we
are not sure that it is possible to satisfy all the incentive and acceptance constraints.
34However, in the optimal side mechanism against Md (denote it by SOd), the seller
certainly loses with respect to the case of no coalition. Indeed, from Proposition 3,
there exists a weakly collusion proof sale mechanism denoted by M0which achieves the
proﬁt she obtains with Md and SOd . However, in M0,a tl e a s to n eo ft h et w ot y p e sm u s t
have strictly higher payoﬀ with respect to the case of no coalition otherwise SOd would
not be the optimal side mechanism against Md.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
We are interested in grand-mechanisms such that L-type’s incentive constraint is not














subject to the following constraints.





















































































































LH] ≥ V (θL),













HL] ≥ V (θL),
We introduce the following multipliers:
• ρx(θ
1,θ










i for the H-type’s Bayesian incentive constraint concerning buyer i,
• vi
L for the L-type’s acceptance constraint concerning buyer i,
• vi
H for the H-type’s acceptance constraint concerning buyer i.
We deﬁne the Lagrangian as follows:



































Step 1: Optimizing with respect to yi(θ
1,θ
2)
After optimizing with respect to yi




i(1 − λ) − v
i
H(1 − λ)=0 , for i =1 ,2.
After optimizing with respect to y1
HL and y2










2(1 − λ) − v
2
L(1 − λ)=0
After optimizing with respect to y1
LH and y2




1(1 − λ) − v
1







After optimizing with respect to yi






Lλ =0 , for i =1 ,2.























, for j 6= k.













Step 2: Optimizing with respect to xi(θ
1,θ
2)
After optimizing with respect to xi














HH)=0 , for i =1 ,2.
38In homogeneous coalitions, HH and LL, the reallocation cannot lead to corner solutions. In
coalition HL, instead, this is conceivable but it is not going to occur when the seller designs the sale














After optimizing with respect to x1
HL and x2





































,w eo b t a i n

















where ε = δ
1−λ+δ+vH.
After optimizing with respect to x1
LH and x2





























From the two above equations, and recalling that θ
ε
L = θL − 1−λ












After optimizing with respect to xi














LL)=0 , for i =1 ,2.
Since the multipliers are symmetric, the above equations imply that q1(φLL)+x1
LL =
q2(φLL)+x2
LL.S i n c e x1
LL + x2





Step 3: Optimizing with respect to φ(θ1,θ2)



























































































Proof of Lemma 1









∂x .C l e a r l y ,
V ε
2 (x)=2 θHu(x















For a coalition HLlet us consider for simplicity interior allocations (but the proof is easily
adapted to the non-interior case). Then qε












L(x)].S i n c eu0 is strictly
decreasing and θH > θ
ε
L,w eh a v eqε
H(x) > x
2 >q ε









2). Then we can use a result from section 3 in Maskin and Riley
(1984) to conclude that if (11) holds and CICHH,HL and CICHL,LL (the local downward
coalition incentive constraints) bind, then all the other incentive coalition constraints
are satisﬁed.
39For any q satisfying (11), consider now a transfer proﬁle such that (CICHH,HL) and
(CICHL,LL) bind. In particular, let
tHH = A1 +
tHL + tLH
2




where A1 and A2 depend on q.T h e nw en e e dt om a x i m i z eΠ with respect to (q,tHL,t LH,ε)
subject to (1)-(4) and (10). Conditions (19) do not actually represent any further con-
straints, since transfers appear in Π a n di n( 1) to (4) only through the values of ¯ tL and
¯ tH, which are equal to 1+λ
2 tHL + 1−λ
2 tLH +( 1− λ)A1 and λ
2tHL + 2−λ
2 tLH + λA2 in view
of (19). Since these expressions are linearly independent, by suitably choosing tHL and
tLH any value of the above expressions can be attained, as when (19) does not need to
be satisﬁed.

















































































































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9
The proof of this proposition is very similar to the one provided for n =2 ,h e n c e







k =0 ,1...,n − 1.H e n c e ,i f
(k +1 ) qHk+1 +( n − k − 1)qLk+1 ≥ kqHk +( n − k)qLk for k =0 ,...,n − 1 (20)
40and the local downward coalition incentive constraints bind [the ones preventing a
(k +1 ) −coalition from reporting k], then all the other coalition incentive constraints
are satisﬁed. Moreover, at q = q∗ both (20) and (14) hold (with ε =1 )a n dt h e r e
exist transfers satisfying with equality (BICH), (BIRL) and local downward coalition
incentive constraints.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 3
Assume that if buyer 1 (say) rejects the side mechanism then a non-truthful equilib-
rium is played in M∗, possibly because 2 has non-prior beliefs about θ
i.L e tV N
j denote
the payoﬀ of j-type (j = L,H) of buyer 1 in such equilibrium. Proposition 14 implies
that V N
H ≤ V (θH) and V N
L ≤ V (θL).
If V N
L <V(θL)=0 , then the acceptance constraint of L-type of buyer 1 is not relaxed in
the design of the side mechanism since otherwise L-type would have a negative payoﬀ by
accepting S and therefore, by anticipating this fact, he would have rejected the seller’s
oﬀer of M∗ at stage two.
If V N
H <V(θH), then observe that H-type’s acceptance constraint in the side-mechanism
is slack when his reservation utility is V (θH) (in the sense that the Lagrange multiplier
is zero), hence it is a fortiori slack when the reservation utility of H-type is below V (θH).
The reason is that, when V N
H ≤ V (θH),c o n s t r a i n t(BICS
H) determines the rent of H-type
rather than (BIRS
H).
Proof of Lemma 2
It is useful to write down the payoﬀ matrices in M∗ for L-type and H-type, respec-
tively. For example, θLu(q∗
H) − t∗
HL, the entry in the left table below corresponding to
row H and column L, is the payoﬀ to L-type if he claims H and his opponent reports
L.






















































































2 )] and notice
that g(0) > 0 is equivalent to (22) and g(−q∗
H +q∗
L)=0 . Since we prove in what follows






































































L(x)]. The assumption that u00

























42We ﬁrst show that the second inequality holds and then prove the ﬁrst. The second
inequality in (24) is equivalent to
[θL − (1 + λ)θH]u(q
∗











The deﬁnition of V 1 and the strict concavity of u yield the following inequalities:
V 1(2q∗





















Hence it is suﬃcient to prove that
[2θL − (2 − λ)θH]u(q
∗












which is equivalent to









If (2 − λ)θH − 2θL ≥ 0, then we are done. If instead (2 − λ)θH − 2θL < 0,t h e nw eu s e




L) for some ξ ∈ (q∗
L,q∗
H),




. Finally, it is easy to verify that the following inequality holds



















HLto the left and the right hand side of the second inequality
in (24), respectively. Since the latter holds, (21)i m p l i e st h a tt h eﬁrst inequality is
satisﬁed as well.



















These inequalities are readily proved as follows. H-type has no dominant strategy since
(BICH) binds: either he prefers H against H and L against L, or vice-versa.. However,
we can rule out that H-type wishes to report L against H, because otherwise in view of
(21) he would also prefer to play L against L and he would have a dominant strategy.
From here (25) follows.
43P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 5
In view of (24) and (25), M∗ is a strategically non-trivial game only for the two
H-types, 1H and 2H. The game between them is symmetric and we represent it through
the payoﬀ matrix below, which describes the payoﬀ of 1H (the row player) as a function
of his report and the report of 2H (the column player) while taking into account that 2L










Here L weakly dominates H [see the ﬁrst inequality in (25)], hence there exists a non-
truthful equilibrium; in it, each buyer type reports L. In order to prove that buyers are
Pareto worse oﬀ in the latter equilibrium than under truthtelling, it is suﬃcient to recall
inequalities (13): they establish that each buyer is better oﬀ when his opponent reports
H rather than L. Hence, the truthful equilibrium yields Pareto higher payoﬀst h a nt h e
equilibrium in which everybody reports L.
44References
[1]A l g e r ,I .( 1999), ”Buyer Strategies Limiting the Monopolist’s Power: Multiple and
Joint Purchases”, Rand Journal of Economics, 30: 736-757.
[2] Ausubel, L. and P. Cramton (1999), ”The Optimality of Being Eﬃcient”, Mimeo,
University of Maryland.
[3] Bakos, Y., E. Brynjofsson, and D. Lichtman (1999), ”Shared Information Goods”,
Journal of Law and Economics, 42: 117-155.
[4] Caillaud, B. and P. Jehiel (1998), ”Collusion in Auctions with Externalities”, Rand
Journal of Economics, 29: 680-702.
[5] Cramton, P.C. and T.R. Palfrey (1995), ”Ratiﬁable Mechanisms: Learning from
Disagreement”, Games and Economic Behavior, 10: 255-283.
[6] Graham, D.A. and R.C. Marshall (1987), ”Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-
Object Second-Price and English Auctions”, Journal of Political Economy, 95:
1217-1239.
[7] Heﬂebower, R. (1980) Cooperatives and Mutuals in the Market System, University
of Wisconsin Press
[8] Innes, R. and Sexton, R. (1994), ”Strategic Buyers and Exclusionary Contracts”,
American Economic Review, 84: 566-584.
[9] Laﬀont, J.-J. and D. Martimort (1997), ”Collusion under Asymmetric Information”,
Econometrica, 65: 875-911.
[10] Laﬀont, J.-J. and D. Martimort (2000), ”Mechanism Design with Collusion and
Correlation”, Econometrica, 68: 309-342.
[11] Maskin, E. and J. Riley (1984), ”Monopoly under Incomplete Information”, Rand
Journal of Economics, 15: 171-196.
[12] Mussa, M. and S. Rosen (1978), ”Monopoly and Product Quality”, Journal of
Economic Theory, 18: 301-317.
45[13] McAfee, R.P. and J. McMillan (1992), ”Bidding Rings”, American Economic Re-
view, 82: 579-599.
[14] Rey. P. and J. Tirole (1986), ”The Logic of Vertical restraints”, American Economic
Review, 76: 921-939.
[15] Zheng, C. (2001), ”Optimal Auctions with Resale”, Mimeo, Northwestern Univer-
sity.
46